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 1 
Ignorance, Incompetence, and the  
Concept of Liberty1 
 What is liberty, and can it be measured?  Much attention has been deservedly 
lavished on these critical political questions, and the result has been some hard-earned 
philosophical progress.2  In this paper I hope to inch us a little further.  I shall argue that 
the only way to have a liberty metric is to adopt an account of liberty with specific and 
controversial features.  In particular, I shall argue  that we can make sense of the idea of a 
quantity of liberty only if we are willing to count certain purely agential constraints, such 
as ignorance and physical incompetence, as obstacles to liberty in general.  This spells 
trouble for traditional ‘negative’ accounts, against which I argue directly.  My aim is to 
establish the following somewhat surprising claim: that if a political theory is to contain a 
principle regarding the protection, maximisation, or equalisation of some liberty, it must 
concern itselfon pain of conceptual incoherencewith the positive preconditions (in 
addition to the negative preconditions) of that liberty’s effective exercise. 
 Many political theorists have denied that political theories ought to contain any 
principles that make essential reference to quantities or extents of liberty.  If correct, this 
would render my conditional claim relatively uninteresting.  I shall therefore begin by 
arguing that such theorists are mistaken. 
 
 
 
 2 
A Distinction 
 Consider the following two liberty claims: 
(1) A is at liberty to go to the park 
(2) A has liberty of movement 
These claims are logically distinct.  Let me explain what I have in mind, beginning with 
(1). 
 Say that I can only get to the park by bus, and that there are two buses I can take, 
the 12 or the 88.  They take different routes but are equally efficient means of travel.  
Plausibly, I am at liberty to go to the park if I have either the liberty to take the 12 to the 
park or the liberty to take the 88 to the park.  If I am banned from taking the 12, but can 
still take the 88, I remain at liberty to go to the park.  Thus the liberty to go to the park 
requires merely the disjunction of more specific liberties: intuitively, I am at liberty to go 
to the park if there is at least one way I can get there.  Let me call this ‘disjunctive liberty’ 
or ‘liberty in the disjunctive sense’. 
 This may be contrasted with (2).  Suppose that I am held in a straightjacket, able to 
move only my little finger.  Intuitively, this is a case in which I pretty much lack liberty of 
movement.  So liberty of movement requires more than just the liberty to move in at least 
one specific way: it requires that one have open to one some (sufficiently extensive) range 
of liberties of movement.  It requires an aggregation, not a disjunction, of more specific 
liberties.  Let me call this ‘aggregative liberty’ or ‘liberty in the aggregative sense’. 
 This distinction concerns the logical form of liberty statements and is independent 
of their content.  In principle, any liberty may be understood in either sense.  One could, if 
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one wished, consider my liberty of park-travel, something that increases the more ways I 
have of getting to the park, and decreases the more restricted I am in my travel to the park 
(as when I am banned from taking the 12).  Similarly, we may speak of a person’s liberty 
to move, where this is understood disjunctively as the liberty to move at all.  As this 
suggests, natural language tracks the distinction with its two contrasting formulations, the 
liberty to x and liberty of x (though this is only a rough guide). 
 Plausibly, aggregative liberty involves an aggregation of more particular 
disjunctive liberties: the extent of a person’s liberty of movement, for instance, seems to 
depend in some way upon the number of specific movements that person is at liberty to 
make.  And it seems that the simple claim that a person ‘has liberty of movement’ should 
be understood as the claim that the person has some (unspecified but sufficient) number of 
more specific liberties of movement.  But this ideathat it is possible to ‘count up’ a 
person’s libertieshas been widely rejected.  The problem concerns liberty individuation; 
in Isaiah Berlin’s words, ‘possibilities of action are not discrete entities like apples, which 
can be exhaustively enumerated’.3  If Berlin is correctand if, as widely feared, this spells 
disaster for any attempt to sum libertiesthen the notion of aggregative liberty will have 
to be abandoned as conceptually incoherent. 
 Later in this paper I shall discuss the charge of conceptual incoherence in detail.   
For now, I want to stress the importance of the issue for political theory.  I shall argue that 
no reasonable liberal theory can get by without the aggregative notion of liberty. 
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The Importance of Aggregation 
 Sometimes we speak of a person’s liberty tout court.  Let me call this completely 
general liberty.  Other times, we talk about specific subsets of this liberty, such as one’s 
liberty of speech, of assembly, of conscience, and so on.  Let me call these somewhat 
general liberties.  In addition, we often speak of liberties to perform certain act-types more 
specifically defined, such as the liberty to go to the park, or the liberty to criticise the 
government.  Let me call these somewhat specific liberties. 
 It is often assumed that the problems of conceptual incoherence concerning the 
aggregation of liberties apply solely to completely general liberty.  This encourages the 
idea that we may avoid these problems simply by doing away with completely general 
liberty as a notion relevant to political theory.  Instead of aiming to maximise ‘overall 
freedom’, we should aim to protect ‘particular liberties’; thus avoiding the problem that 
‘judgements of greater and lesser freedom may be impossible to make’.4   
 One of the most prominent partakers of this strategy has been John Rawls, who 
famously abandoned his original commitment to ‘the most extensive total system of equal 
basic liberties’,5 opting to cast his theory instead in terms of ‘certain specific liberties’, 
specified ‘by a list’.  The list includes ‘freedom of thought and liberty of conscience; the 
political liberties and freedom of association, as well as the freedoms specified by the 
liberty and integrity of the person; and finally, the rights and liberties covered by the rule 
of law’.6  In stating his principle in this way Rawls takes himself to have avoided any 
commitment to contentious claims regarding the possibility of measurements of liberty.7 
 Yet this move in fact offers no such reprieve.  This is because the somewhat 
general liberties on Rawls’ list are still themselves aggregative.  Take any item from the 
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list: for instance, freedom of assembly.  Were this understood disjunctively (as the freedom 
to assemble) it would require merely the possession of at least one specific liberty to 
assemble in a certain time and place.  But while a group free to assemble only for five 
minutes on one day of the year atop a mountain peak has, a fortiori, the freedom to 
assemble, it does not, in the ordinary sense, enjoy freedom of assembly.  For freedom of 
assembly, one requires some reasonable variety and number of such somewhat specific 
liberties.8   
 Yet surely, it may be objected, if the government passes no laws restricting 
freedom of assembly, then freedom of assembly is protected; no aggregation is necessary.  
This is correct, but it does not get us very far.  Two points need to be made.  First, the mere 
absence of a legal restriction is insufficient to yield a liberty: most theorists hold that 
political liberty may be restricted by private individuals as well as by lawmakers.  Very 
well, the objector may respond, but broadening the relevant sense of liberty from the 
narrowly legal raises no new problems.  To have freedom of assembly, we shall say, one 
must be unprevented in one’s attempts to assemble; if any attempted assembly is 
prevented, one lacks freedom of assembly.  Still no aggregation is required. 
 This leads to the second point.  Perfect or total freedom of assembly is unnecessary 
for freedom of assembly.  One may have freedom of assembly while being prevented from 
assembling at some specific time and place.  For instance, groups A and B are mutually 
prevented from assembling at the exact same time at the exact same place, since bodies 
cannot interpenetrate.  But neither group thereby lacks freedom of assembly.  This is 
fortunate, since otherwise no more than one group could enjoy freedom of assembly; and 
no more than one person could enjoy freedom of movement, freedom of expression, or 
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freedom of religion. To paraphrase Keith Dowding and Martin van Hees, we do not want 
to say that at least some individuals lack freedom of religion because it is physically 
impossible that all individuals attend a Sunday service.9  Rather than requiring perfect 
unpreventedness, liberties such as these operate as threshold concepts: they require the 
possession of some sufficient amount of the relevant liberty, where this may fall short of 
the total amount possible (though obviously not by too much).10 
 This means that in order to determine whether, say, freedom of assembly is 
protected in some society, we must have a way of determining how much freedom of 
assembly the society’s citizens enjoy, in order to see whether it is above the threshold 
amount.  So protection of something like freedom of assembly presupposes the conceptual 
coherence of aggregative liberty claims.  It follows from this that any plausible liberal 
theory must employ the aggregative notion of liberty.  This is the case even if we believe 
(and there are many good reasons for so believing) that overall liberty is not an important 
political good.  This is because overall liberty is not the only aggregative liberty.  The most 
important liberal freedomssuch as those specified by Rawls’ listare logically 
aggregative as well. 
 There is no easy way around the charges of conceptual incoherence that plague 
aggregative liberty: such problems are problems for us all.  Luckily, I shall argue, they are 
not insuperable.  But an adequate solution comes at a price: specifically, it requires us to 
adopt a conception of liberty that recognises positive as well as negative constraints on 
freedom. 
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Agential Constraints 
 Much of the debate over the nature of liberty has focused on the issue of 
constraints.  I wish to address two questions at the centre of this.  The first is: must 
constraints always be external to the agent?  The second is: must constraints always be 
attributable to other agents?  Though it is not my aim in this paper to propose a complete 
account of liberty, I shall seek to place limits on any such account by arguing for negative 
answers to both of these questions. 
 More specifically, I shall argue for two related claims.  First, that internal obstacles 
such as ignorance and physical incompetence are potential constraints on action in a sense 
relevant to liberty; second, that these constraints must be counted as such regardless of 
whether they are attributable to other agents.  Hence there may be internal constraints on 
liberty, and constraints on liberty need not be attributable to other agents.  I shall argue that 
we must accept these claims if we are to save the notion of aggregative liberty from 
conceptual incoherence. 
 Though I shall not be proposing a full account of liberty, it will be helpful for us to 
get into focus what an account consistent with these claims might look like.  As it happens, 
these claims are embodied by perhaps the simplest and most familiar classical account of 
liberty, namely 
 (L) A is at liberty to x iff A would x were A to try to x 
I am not interested in the details of this account; in fact, my preferred formulation is 
slightly different.11  What matters for my present argument is that it elegantly encapsulates 
the above two conditions on possible constraints on liberty: I shall argue in favour of 
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accounts like L, where the relevant similarity is the accounts’ acceptance of the relevance 
of ignorance and incompetence to assessments of liberty.   
 On L, ignorance is a constraint on liberty: if I have no idea how to x then I will not 
succeed in an attempt to x.  Incompetence is also a constraint: if successful x-ing is beyond 
my physical power, I will fail in attempting to x.  Moreover, L recognises the relevance of 
such constraints regardless of whether their existence is attributable to other agents.  I call 
accounts of this type agential accounts, since they assess liberty simply from the point of 
view of agents’ interests in successful action; the constraints they recognise are agential as 
well, since they include all obstacles to the successful implementation of action. 
 Accounts of this type stand directly opposed to the currently dominant ‘negative’ 
account of liberty, according to which an agent’s liberty is reduced iff (i) the agent’s 
option-set is reduced and (ii) this reduction is attributable to another agent.12  Condition (ii) 
commits negative libertarians to a positive answer to the second of my two questions 
concerning constraints (must constraints always be attributable to other agents?).13  My 
strategy is to argue that this defining feature of the negative account is untenable if we 
wish to employ the aggregative notion of liberty, as it seems that all liberals must.  
Accordingly, I shall now examine in detail the charges of conceptual incoherence levelled 
at the aggregative notion of liberty, arguing that they can be met only if we are willing to 
accept an agential account.   
 
Aggregating Liberty 
 It is a sign of how battle-worn is the notion of aggregative liberty that the 
objections against it may profitably be grouped by kind.  Allow me, then, to distinguish 
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between aggregative liberty’s coherence and plausibility problems.  The former include 
challenges such as: Is there any such thing as ‘the number of options open to an agent’?  Is 
there any answer to the question of how many liberties I exercise in raising my arm?  By 
having one liberty (say, the liberty to raise my arm) do I thereby have an indefinite number 
of liberties (say, to raise it by twenty centimetres, by ten centimetres, by five 
centimetres…)?  Do all agents turn out to be infinitely free? 
 These problems pertain to the possibility of having a workable metric for assessing 
extents of freedom in the first place.  Objections in the second group concern the 
plausibility of the idea that any measurement of mere extent can capture what really 
matters to us about aggregative liberty.  The tricky questions in this group include: Are all 
liberties weighted equally when making overall assessments, or does the liberty to vote for 
the political party of your choice count for more than the liberty to buy the ice-cream of 
your choice?  If it counts for more, does it count for more liberty?  If so, how?  Do we take 
into account subjective importance or objective importance?  Does the variety of one’s 
options increase one’s overall liberty?    
 In this paper I shall address only the coherence problems.  I shall argue that we 
require an agential account of liberty to make sense of the bare idea of ‘the number of 
options open to an agent’.  How the account is developed from therewhether, for 
instance, we deem it necessary to weight options, and, if so, how we assign the weightsis 
beyond the scope of this paper.14  The solutions I offer to the coherence problems are 
consistent with almost any set of responses to the plausibility problems. Moreover, the 
plausibility problems cannot even arise until the coherence problems have been answered; 
answering them is the task to which I now turn. 
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 The theoretically simplest account of aggregative liberty would be one on which 
A’s (aggregative) liberty of x is calculated by adding together all of A’s disjunctive liberties 
to perform actions under descriptions that are specifiers of x.  For example, to calculate A’s 
liberty of speech, we would add up all the disjunctive liberties enjoyed by A which are 
liberties to speak.  Yet such an account will not do.  In fact, it faces at least three problems, 
which have been called the problem of indefinite subdivision; the problem of indefinite 
numbers of descriptions; and the problem of indefinite causal chains.15  These problems 
have been addressed by a number of theorists with an encouraging degree of success.  
Most comprehensive of the responses have been those by Ian Carter, which build usefully 
on earlier responses by Hillel Steiner.16  However, I shall argue that Carter’s solutions 
ultimately fail to address these problems.  I shall demonstrate that successful solutions are 
availablebut only if we are willing to recognise the relevance of agential constraints. 
 
Indefinite Subdivision 
 Onora O’Neill states the basic problem: 
 
If liberties are liberties to do certain actions, and actions can be individuated in diverse 
ways, then liberties can be individuated in diverse ways.  If so it would always be possible 
to show that any given set of liberties was as numerous as any other merely by listing the 
component liberties more specifically.  We can, if we want to, take any libertye.g. the 
liberty to seek public office or the liberty to form a familyand divide it up into however 
many component liberties we find useful to distinguish—or for that matter into more than 
we find it useful to distinguish.17 
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 Let me put this more precisely.  Liberties may be more or less specific, depending 
on the specificity of their act descriptions.  Following A. J. Ayer, we may say that an act 
description x′ is more specific than another act description x iff x is not a component of x′, 
x′ entails x, and x does not entail x′.18  Hence hitting a bullseye is more specific than hitting 
the darts board, since hitting the darts board is not a component of hitting a bullseye, 
hitting a bullseye entails hitting the darts board, and hitting the darts board does not entail 
hitting a bullseye.  In Ayer’s terms, x′ is here a specifier of x.   
 The problem is that including all specifiers, at all levels of specificity, will lead to 
an account which is at least distorted and at worst incoherent.  The distortion will arise 
from a double counting that comes from including, for instance, both the liberty to hit a 
bullseye and the liberty to hit the darts board.  Since the latter is an entailment of the 
former, it seems wrong to include both in our calculation of an agent’s liberty.  The threat 
of incoherence arises from the fact that any liberty may have an indefinite number of 
specifiers. 
 Clearly, any aggregative calculation of liberty will be distorted so long as it double-
counts by including logical entailments of liberties already included.  The obvious way to 
avoid this is to sum only those specifiers that occur at some certain level of specificity.  
But the question is then: which level? 
 The more specific the level at which we aggregate liberties, the more complete will 
be our metricthe less we will leave out.  We should therefore aim to aggregate liberties 
at the most specific level possible.  However, at the most specific level there may be an 
indefinite number of specifiers.  This is because the most specific liberties conceivable will 
be so complete that they pick out possible act tokens; that is, they will represent perfect 
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descriptions of the possible careers of relevant portions of the universe.  Yet the number of 
possible act tokens, and hence the number of completely specific liberties, may be non-
denumerably infinite.  If it is, then we can expect every incompletely specific act 
description to have an indefinite number of specifiers.  So aggregating at the most specific 
level offers no advance on the issue of conceptual coherence. 
 It appears that we must aggregate at some less specific level.  This is the strategy 
taken by Carter.  Not wanting to rule out the possibility that space and time are indefinitely 
divisible and non-granular, he proposes that we nevertheless ‘need to think of space and 
time as granular’.  Hence (as regards liberty of movement): 
 
While it is true that space and time can in theory be divided up indefinitely, then, the 
division of space and time into equal finite units allows us to represent what we do as a 
matter of fact see as the possibility of greater or lesser possibilities of movement.19 
 
Carter makes no general pronouncement concerning how large or small these notional 
units should be.  He writes that 
 
nothing in the foregoing analysis fixes the size of the space-time units on the basis of 
which we are to make our comparisons.  Clearly, the smaller the units we are working 
with, the more accurate our measurements will be in reflecting what is commonly meant by 
‘the extent of movement available to us’.  Ideally, the units will be smaller than any of the 
distances of the movements (or differences in sizes of objects) that we are interested in 
measuring.20 
 
 However, Carter has no explanation of why we should treat the units of space-time 
as finitely small, other than that this is the only way to make the calculus workable.  Carter 
 13 
says that the smaller the units, the more accurately they will reflect ‘what is commonly 
meant’.  But the worry we are supposed to be addressing is that what is commonly meant is 
incoherent.  Carter has shown that we can approximate to what is commonly meant 
without falling into incoherence.  But then what are we approximating to?  To a calculation 
in terms of the smallest possible units?  Surely not.  So to what then? 
 Carter’s shift to talk of ‘approximation’ is simply a change of subject.  Once we 
have a clear conception of a property we are interested in measuring, then we can discuss 
better and worse ways of measuring it.  But the problem is that we do not yet have a clear 
conception of what we are measuring.  What we need is an independent rationale for 
treating the units as finitely small.  Agential accounts provide exactly such a rationale.  
Indeed, they even dictate precisely how small the units should be in any given case, as I 
shall now explain. 
 No human being is competent to perform a completely specific action.  Suppose 
that you came up with a completely specific description of a possible action of mine: say, a 
movement of my arm, described right down to the path of every subatomic particle.  
Barring special fantastic assumptions, it is the case that were I to try to move my arm in 
this way, I would fail.  I simply lack anything like the close control of my body required to 
perform such an action competently.  If physical incompetence is counted as a general 
obstacle to liberty, it will follow that I am not at liberty to perform this action. 
 On an agential account, no ordinary human agent is ever at liberty to perform a 
completely specific action.  And this is why such liberties are not included in the 
aggregation.  Their non-inclusion follows from a principle already accepted, that we only 
aggregate liberties actually enjoyed by the agent in question.   
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 Moreover, the level of specificity at which we aggregate may be determined by the 
agent whose liberty we are assessing.  To answer O’Neill’s basic charge, we need to settle 
on a single level of specificity at which to aggregate.  The agential account provides a 
natural answer to this: we aggregate the most specific liberties actually open to the agent in 
question.  This leaves nothing out, since more specific liberties are, ex hypothesi, not 
liberties open to the agent, and more general liberties are entailed by these more specific 
liberties.  In addition, it captures the fact that the more agentially competent a person 
isthat is, the more precisely he can control his actionsthe greater his range of possible 
actions, and hence the greater his liberty.21 
 Treating agential incompetence as in general a potential constraint on liberty 
allows us a satisfying answer to the problem of indefinite subdivision.  This response is not 
available to the negative libertarian, who at most treats agential incompetence as 
constraining only in certain special cases (i.e. when it is attributable to another agent).  The 
best solution to this problem, therefore, requires the adoption of an agential account. 
 
Indefinite Numbers of Descriptions 
 The next problem arises from the fact that any action may be picked out by a 
potentially infinite number of true descriptions.  So: with a single physical movement, I 
score a goal, I score a penalty, I win the match, I relieve the fans… and so on.  How many 
actions do I perform?  Some (such as Alvin Goldman) will say I perform at least four 
actions; that is, that each redescription picks out a different action.  Others (such as Donald 
Davidson) will say that I perform one action, which can be described in at least four 
ways.22  More immediately pressing, however, is the question of how many liberties I have 
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exercised.  The worry is that if each new act-description also describes a new liberty, then 
the potential infinity of true act-descriptions will translate into a potential infinity of 
liberties.  By virtue of the liberty to perform one action, a person will have the liberty to 
perform infinitely many actions (that same action under infinitely many true 
redescriptions).   
 Carter’s response is to deny that liberties can be generated by redescribing actions.  
Hence he treats the liberty to x and the liberty to x under a different description as the same 
liberty, in essence applying to liberty-individuation Davidson’s strategy for act-
individuation.23 
 Yet although Davidson may have provided a correct account of act individuation, 
Carter’s attempt to apply this to the rather different matter of liberty individuation is 
deeply problematic.  In particular, his strategy faces two related problems.  The first is that 
it commits Carter to an implausible reading of ignorance cases.  Suppose that I am trapped 
in a cell the door of which has a combination lock.  It is undeniable in this case that I have 
the liberty to punch any series of numbers into the lockno agent prevents it, no costs 
attach to it, I am not incapacitated from doing it in any way.  This includes the liberty to 
punch in what happens to be the correct combination, 7-3-5-1-9-2-8.  Intuitively, however, 
I lack the liberty to open the lock.  Yet punching in the numbers 7-3-5-1-9-2-8 just is 
opening the lock.  On Davidson’s view, these are alternative ways of describing the same 
action.  And on Carter’s view, the liberty to punch in 7-3-5-1-9-2-8 just is the liberty to 
open the lock: these are alternative ways of describing the same liberty.  Carter is therefore 
committed to saying either that, since I am at liberty to punch in 7-3-5-1-9-2-8, I am 
therefore at liberty to open the lock (my captors have failed to incarcerate me), or that, 
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since I am not at liberty to open the lock, I am therefore not at liberty to punch in the 
numbers 7-3-5-1-9-2-8 (though nothing prevents it).  Neither of these options is appealing. 
 Whatever the correct theory of act individuation, it is difficult to deny that liberties 
multiply under different descriptions.  To confirm this, consider again the football case 
above.  Any of the relevant liberties in that case (the liberty to score a goal, to win the 
match, and so on) can be had without the others.  If we are losing 4-0 in the final minute 
and I am suddenly faced with an open goal, I have the liberty to score a goal but not the 
liberty to score a penalty, win the match, or relieve the fans.  If we are having a penalty-
kick training session, I have the liberty to score a penalty but not to win a match or relieve 
any fans.  And so on.  Were any of these apparently different liberties in fact the same 
liberty then it would be inconceivable that anyone could have one without thereby having 
the other.  Since this clearly is conceivable, these must be different liberties. 
 The conclusion that each liberty must be included separately in a calculation of an 
agent’s aggregative liberty is therefore unavoidable.  The concern is then that this will 
mandate the inclusion of indefinitely many liberties (since the number of true descriptions 
of any action is indefinitely large).  Conceptual incoherence threatens once more. 
 Again, agential accounts have the resources to meet this threat.  In this case, the 
solution stems from their recognition of ignorance as a general constraint on liberty.  
Consider a more exotic redescription of my act of goal scoring, such as: the only action I 
performed at the exact moment an asteroid collided with Alpha Centauri.  This is, let us 
assume, a true description of my act of scoring the winning goal.  Yet it is not a description 
of an action I am at liberty to perform.  On plausible assumptions about my ignorance of 
astronomical events, were I to attempt to perform a unique action at the exact moment an 
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asteroid collides with Alpha Centauri I would fail.  I would fail because I have no idea how 
to perform such an action—I lack relevant instrumental knowledge.  It is not therefore the 
case that each time we truly redescribe the act component of a liberty enjoyed by an agent, 
we get another liberty enjoyed by an agent.   
 Negative accounts cannot adopt this solution to the problem of indefinite numbers 
of descriptions, since it requires treating ignorance as a general obstacle to liberty.  Again, 
if we are to have a conceptually coherent notion of aggregative liberty, we must abandon 
the negative account and recognise the relevance of agential constraints. 
 
Indefinite Causal Chains 
 Every action serves as the cause of an indefinitely large number of other events.  
Some of these further consequences clearly count as actions of mine, and somefor 
instance, consequences that obtain long after my deathequally clearly do not.  So: I pull 
the trigger, I fire a bullet, I kill the Archduke, I start a World War… and so on.  How far 
down a sequence such as this do we go?24 
 Again, we are not here interested in the problem of act individuation for its own 
sake.  The question is: by virtue of having the liberty to initiate such a sequence, how many 
other liberties do I thereby have?  In particular, do I thereby have an indefinite number of 
liberties?  The worry is that, if this is the case, aggregations of liberty will again prove 
impossible. 
 Matthew Kramer offers the following proposal.  He writes: 
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When we can judge with confidence that some particular consequences are highly likely to 
ensue if a person exercises this or that freedom, we should incorporate those consequences 
(with probabilistic qualifications) into our calculations… Moreover, we should also take 
account of causal consequences even if they are not highly likely to ensue from the exercise 
of an opportunity, so long as we can confidently assign probabilities to their ensuing.25 
 
On Kramer’s account, we are to include each item of the causal chain, but discount each in 
our overall calculation in proportion to the likelihood of its occurring.  Yet we cannot rule 
out the possibility that, in performing a single ordinary action, the number of causal results 
thereby generated with non-zero probability might be infinite.  To get round this, Kramer 
requires that we include only those outcomes to which ‘we can confidently assign 
probabilities’. 
 Much like Carter’s response to the problem of indefinite subdivision, however, this 
proposal suffers from a confusion between pragmatic and conceptual concerns.  In 
evaluating someone’s liberty, we would certainly do well to restrict ourselves to dealing 
only with probabilities we can ‘confidently assign’.  This would help us approximate as 
well as we can to the person’s actual extent of liberty.  Yet there is no reason to think that 
the object of our approximationthe actual extent of the person’s libertyshould be 
restricted by our contingent epistemic limitations in this way.  What possible conceptual 
(as opposed to merely pragmatic) reason could there be for excluding difficult-to-assign 
probabilities from our account?  Again, Kramer’s sole reason seems to be that this is the 
only way to save the notion of aggregative liberty from conceptual incoherenceand those 
who believe the notion to be fundamentally incoherent are unlikely to be reassured by this. 
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 Carter has a different solution.  It is to assess liberty ‘in terms of the foreseeable 
consequences of given possible (or actual) actions, rather than in terms of what would 
actually happen’.26  This answer is simple and intuitive.  However, in the absence of other 
epistemic conditions, Carter’s introduction of one to solve this problem is ad hoc.  Why 
should ignorance about the consequences of one’s actions render one unfree to bring about 
those consequences, when ignorance in general does not contribute to unfreedom?  By not 
counting lack of knowledge as necessarily constraining, Carter is unable to explain why 
liberty should be assessed only in terms of foreseeable consequences. 
 On an agential account, by contrast, a lack of relevant knowledge is in all cases a 
restriction on liberty.  It therefore agrees with Carter that we should include only 
foreseeable outcomes in our calculation; but it avoids the charge that this is simply an ad 
hoc condition.  Again, recognising the general relevance of agential constraints to the 
concept of liberty allows us a clean and elegant response to the coherence problems faced 
by the aggregative notion of liberty. 
 
The Irrelevance of Unfreedom 
 Put simply, no person is infinitely free because there is a limit to what any person 
can do.  Agential accounts capture this simple fact.  Though the numbers involved may be 
very large, the notion of an aggregation of liberty is not conceptually incoherent, and may 
support interpersonal and intersocietal comparisons, as well as absolute judgements, in 
something at least approaching the ordinary sense.  Adopting an agential account of 
libertythat is, recognising natural constraints such as ignorance and physical 
incompetenceallows us a convincing response to the coherence problems dogging the 
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aggregative notion of liberty.  I stated above that problems pertaining to the plausibility of 
a simple summation as a complete account of aggregative liberty lie beyond the scope of 
this paper.  That is, all such problems except one, which I now discuss. 
 There is currently something of a consensus to the effect that an agent’s overall 
liberty must be calculated as a proportion of the total possible amount of liberty available 
to her.  According to Steiner, Carter and Kramer, we must measure not only an agent’s 
freedoms but also her unfreedoms.  On their accounts, an agent’s overall freedom is 
measured as a proportion of her total freedoms plus unfreedoms: the formula is (some 
version of) F / F + U (where F represents her total freedom and U her total unfreedom).27 
 The deep reason for adopting this proportional account of overall liberty is 
acceptance of the negative account of liberty.  On Steiner’s view, for instance, one is only 
unfree when prevented by other agents from performing actions: ‘freedom is a social 
relation, not a technological one… it’s a relation between persons and persons, not 
between persons and nature’.28  This means that (F + U) is not constant.  A technological 
innovation may increase both a person’s freedoms and her unfreedoms: for instance, the 
invention of nuclear power increased our freedom (we now have a new option concerning 
how to generate electricity) but also our unfreedom (we are now prevented from building 
reactors in our back gardens).  Before the invention of nuclear power we were not unfree to 
build reactors in our back gardens, on Steiner’s view, since no one prevented it.  As the 
sphere of prevented action has now increased, Steiner wants his account to reflect this.  
This principle is also accepted by Carter and Kramer.29 
 If instead of a negative account we begin with an agential account, however, all of 
this complexity may be avoided.  On an agential account (such as L, above) the number of 
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unfreedoms for any finite agent is always infiniteand thus constant.  Accordingly, we do 
not need our aggregation to take unfreedoms into account.  We need measure only an 
agent’s freedoms.  For those who like formulas, the agential formula is simply F.  This 
simplicity is one of the agential account’s many advantages. 
 The refusal to count unfreedoms follows from the rejection of the negative account 
of liberty.  I have already offered what I take to be one of the best arguments against the 
negative account: that any plausible liberal theory is committed to aggregative liberty 
claims, and that only an agential account is able to make conceptual sense of liberty in the 
aggregative sense.  This is a powerful argument against the negative libertarians’ 
commitment to treating only humanly imposed constraints as relevant to assessments of 
liberty.  Despite this, however, I expect that negative libertarians may be unswayed, as I 
shall explain in the next and final section. 
 
Ordinary Usage and Conceptual Clarity 
 To my argument as presented so far, the negative libertarian may respond as 
follows.  You have succeeded in showing that not everything faces an aggregation 
problem.  You have demonstrated that somethingability, power, freedom in some special 
sensemay be aggregated without falling into conceptual confusion.  But the problem was 
that liberty could not be aggregated, and on this issue you have made no progress.  No 
purely agential account is an account of liberty in the relevant sense.  So your solution 
misses the point of the problem. 
 Against this I maintain that agential accounts have as much claim to the title of 
liberty as do negative accounts.  Given that they do, their ability to deliver coherent 
 22 
aggregative liberty judgements is a strong reason for preferring them to rival negative 
accounts.  Yet establishing this first claim requires arguing against a wide consensus, one 
summed up in Kristján Kristjánsson’s contention that the negative account is to be 
preferred both ‘for the sake of ordinary usage… and that of conceptual clarity’.30  In this 
section I shall address these claims. 
 First, ordinary usage.  Arguments on this matter are always likely to be fruitless in 
the absence of empirical linguistic research.  It is with caution that I note, then, that my 
linguistic experience is very different from that reported by most negative libertarians: that 
is, no non-philosopher I know would naturally describe a man born with no legs as at 
liberty to get up, walk around and dance the bolero, as would be the case if natural 
language understood ‘liberty’ in its negative sense.  Perhaps I move in atypical linguistic 
circles.  At any rate, it is, I am sure, at least safe to say that there is sufficient variation in 
ordinary uses of the term ‘liberty’ to render such appeals indecisive. 
 However, this may be too quick a dismissal of the linguistic case for negative 
liberty.  For it has also often been argued, on historical grounds, that non-negative uses of 
the term represent deviations from its ‘core’ or ‘original’ meaning.  Hayek, for instance, 
calls liberty in the agential sense ‘a metaphorical use of the word’, representing a 
‘confusion of liberty as power with liberty in its original meaning’.31  Berlin levels a 
similar charge of etymological ignorance: after introducing ‘the notion of “negative” 
freedom’ he claims that ‘this is what the classical English political philosophers meant 
when they used this word’, adding in a footnote a quotation from Hobbes: ‘a free man is he 
that… is not hindered to do what he hath the will to do’.32 
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 However, the idea that the major figures of Anglophone political philosophy 
understood liberty in its negative sense is demonstrably false.  Berlin’s reference to 
Hobbes is particularly egregious, since Hobbes counts all external impediments as 
restrictions on liberty, regardless of their origin.  Hobbes writes: ‘Liberty is the absence of 
all the impediments to action that are not contained in the nature and intrinsical quality of 
the agent.  As for example, the water is said to descend freely, or to have liberty to descend 
by the channel of the river, because there is no impediment that way, but not across 
because the banks are impediments’.33  When he says that a free man is ‘he that is not 
hindered’ he means hindered by anything and not, as Berlin would have us believe, merely 
by other agents. 
 John Locke also understands liberty as a type of ability.  He writes: ‘the idea of 
liberty is the idea of a power in any agent to do or forbear any particular action, according 
to the determination or thought of the mind… Our idea of liberty reaches as far as that 
power, and no farther’.34  Finally, and for good measure, we may note that Hume also 
understood liberty in this same sense: ‘By liberty then, we can only mean a power of 
acting or not acting, according to the determination of the will; that is, if we choose to 
remain at rest, we may; if we choose to move, we may’.35  Contrary to Hayek and Berlin’s 
claims, therefore, the historical considerations in fact tell against the negative account.  So 
much for ordinary usage. 
 The second common reason for understanding ‘liberty’ in its negative sense is ‘that 
of conceptual clarity’.  Berlin made the point thus: ‘everything is what it is: liberty is 
liberty, not equality or fairness or justice or culture, or human happiness or a quiet 
conscience’.36  This is uncontestablebut many negative libertarians would wish to add 
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‘ability’ and ‘agential power’ to the list.  Yet to do so in this context is simply to beg the 
question.  Compare the following: ‘everything is what it is: a bachelor is a bachelor, not a 
horse or a table or a woman or a man’.  This is false; a bachelor is a certain type of man.  
Accordingly, the claim on the table is that liberty is a certain type of agential power.  
Stating that it is not is all very well, but the negative libertarian requires an argument. 
 Kristjánsson tries a different tack: 
 
For surely, we often want to distinguish in our language between natural and man-made 
impediments, and, by categorising them all as constraints on freedom, we obliterate that 
very distinction in the same way as we would obliterate the distinction between cars and 
bicycles by calling both ‘cars’.  If only for the sake of conceptual clarification, we are well 
advised to accept that, just as we are often unfree to do what we are able to do, we are also 
often free to do what we are unable to do.37 
 
Yet the distinction between negative and agential constraints is importantly different from 
that between cars and bicycles.  Negative constraints and agential constraints are not 
contraries: agential constraints include negative constraints.  Negative constraints form a 
subset of agential constraints.  Categorising all impediments as constraints on liberty is 
thus not like using ‘car’ to refer both to bicycles and to cars, but like using it to refer both 
to sports cars and to family cars.  As this makes plain, agential liberty obliterates no 
distinctions.  A man-made constraint is a particular kind of constraint, just as a sports car is 
a particular kind of car. 
 S. I. Benn proposes a different conceptual argument.  Of the negative libertarian’s 
intentional interference requirement he writes: 
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This condition is consequent upon the primary functions of the concept of freedom in 
practical discourse, as a counter for expressing grievances, claiming rights, and defending 
interests… For a restriction of options to give rise to a discussion of freedom and 
unfreedom and not merely of possibility and impossibility, it must make sense to ask, 
‘What justifies that restriction?’  But it is pointless to ask for a justification unless one 
supposes that things might be different from the way they are but for the will or the 
negligence of a responsible being… It follows, then, that freedom in the full sense is about 
the absence of restriction of the options available to independent agents or choosers, by 
persons having the capacity for deliberate and intentional interference, who might have 
made things otherwise had they so decided.38 
 
Liberty, as opposed to other related modal concepts, is marked out by its specific 
normative function. 
 Now I do not, of course, deny that liberty plays this role.  Given a commitment to 
the principle of non-interference, any intentional restriction of options on the part of 
another is going to generate, at the very least, a demand for justification.  This is not 
enough, however, to get Benn his conclusion.  Benn requires the much stronger claim that 
this is the only role played by the concept of liberty: that it is never (or never properly) 
used in contexts in which questions relating to violations of the principle of non-
interference do not arise.  This is what I deny.  Moreover, Benn has no argument for this 
stronger claim.  His argument involves simply pointing to the fact that the concept of 
liberty often plays a role in adjudicating culpability for violations of various moral 
principles.  This does not, however, show that the concept of liberty never plays any other 
role. 
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 The negative libertarian could perhaps respond by reminding us that we are in the 
business of political philosophy, and that our target is therefore that of political liberty 
narrowly construed.  Politics, having to do with relations between persons, has special use 
for the negative conception, which focuses our attention on the social aspects of liberty.  
This is why the negative account is to be preferred to the agential account for the purposes 
of political theory.  While the agential account may be important for certain purposes, he 
could argue, it will not do as an account of political liberty, for such an account must be 
fundamentally social. 
 Yet such a move, though reasonable enough on the surface, disguises assumptions 
about the methodology of philosophical and political argument that are quite astonishing.  
Consider, for instance, what is to be said about the liberty of those born with physical 
disabilities.  On a standard negative account, these disabilities do not count as impediments 
to freedom.  A negative libertarian responding along the lines sketched above will defend 
this result by saying that, while there is some sense in which the physically disabled are 
unfree, it is not one relevant to liberty in its political sense.  Now I am ultimately unsure 
exactly what force is supposed to be behind the charge that a type of liberty is not a type of 
political liberty; I can only presume it means that such a liberty is not of political 
relevance.  Interpreted in this way, then, the negative libertarian’s claim is that natural 
limitations of options, such as those faced by the physically disabled, are in themselves 
irrelevant to political theory.39 
 Many will find this claim implausible.  But even those sympathetic to it should find 
unreasonable the way at which it is arrived.  If the negative libertarian wishes to deny the 
political relevance of natural constraints as the result of some substantive political 
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argument, that is one thing.  In making this move, however, the negative libertarian seems 
to take the claim as self-evident; indeed, the supposed political irrelevance of natural 
constraints appears to be taken to follow simply from the pretheoretic meaning of the word 
‘political’.  Revealing this assumption is sufficient to refute it: the way to substantive 
political doctrines is not by a simple conceptual analysis of the word ‘political’.  It is 
doubtful in the extreme what argumentative force should be accorded to such an 
analysisif even we share enough of the relevant intuitions to agree upon one in the first 
place, which is rather unlikely.  Better to adopt a broad definition of liberty and leave 
issues of political relevance to substantive political debate.  Agential accounts serve us 
well in this. 
 
Conclusion 
 Only an agential account of liberty has the features required to rebut the charges of 
conceptual incoherence levelled at the aggregative notion of liberty.  If we are to make 
conceptually coherent aggregative claims regarding liberty, we must be willing to 
recognise agential constraints, such as ignorance and incompetence, as potential obstacles 
to liberty in general.  Moreover, all of the central liberal freedoms are logically 
aggregative.  This means that anyone who wishes to include such freedoms in their theory 
of justice must adopt an agential account of liberty.  If a theory is to exhort the value of, 
say, freedom of expression, it must concern itself not only with that freedom’s negative 
requirements, such as the absence of legal restrictions on speech, but also on its positive 
requirements: the provision of the necessary means for the freedom’s exercise.   
 28 
 Put in general terms, the consequence is that the promotion of liberty requires the 
acquisition and propagation of knowledge, and the general development and protection of 
human capacity. 
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